[tls] Ensure received data list is initialised before calling tls_free()
A failure in tls_generate_random() will result in a call to ref_put()
before the received data list has been initialised, which will cause
free_tls() to attempt to traverse an uninitialised list.
Fix by ensuring that all fields referenced by free_tls() are
initialised before any of the potential failure paths.
Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
Support renegotiation with servers supporting RFC5746. This allows
for the use of per-directory client certificates.
Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
[tls] Keep cipherstream window open until TLS negotiation is complete
When performing a SAN boot, the plainstream window size will be zero
(since this is the mechanism used internally to indicate that no data
should be fetched via the initial request). This zero value currently
propagates to the advertised TCP window size, which prevents the TLS
negotiation from completing.
Fix by ensuring that the cipherstream window is held open until TLS
negotiation is complete, and only then falling back to passing through
the plainstream window size.
Reported-by: John Wigley <johnwigley#ipxe@acorna.co.uk>
Tested-by: John Wigley <johnwigley#ipxe@acorna.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
[tls] Avoid potential out-of-bound reads in length fields
Many TLS records contain variable-length fields. We currently
validate the overall record length, but do so only after reading the
length of the variable-length field. If the record is too short to
even contain the length field, then we may read uninitialised data
from beyond the end of the record.
This is harmless in practice (since the subsequent overall record
length check would fail regardless of the value read from the
uninitialised length field), but causes warnings from some analysis
tools.
Fix by validating that the overall record length is sufficient to
contain the length field before reading from the length field.
Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
[crypto] Support SHA-{224,384,512} in X.509 certificates
Add support for SHA-224, SHA-384, and SHA-512 as digest algorithms in
X.509 certificates, and allow the choice of public-key, cipher, and
digest algorithms to be configured at build time via config/crypto.h.
Originally-implemented-by: Tufan Karadere <tufank@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
[tls] Do not access beyond the end of a 24-bit integer
The current implementation handles big-endian 24-bit integers (which
occur in several TLS record types) by treating them as big-endian
32-bit integers which are shifted by 8 bits. This can result in
"Invalid read" errors when running under valgrind, if the 24-bit field
happens to be exactly at the end of an I/O buffer.
Fix by ensuring that we touch only the three bytes which comprise the
24-bit integer.
Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
This fixes "initialization discards 'const' qualifier from pointer
target type" warnings with GCC 5.1.0.
Signed-off-by: Christian Hesse <mail@eworm.de>
Modified-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
[crypto] Generalise X.509 cache to a full certificate store
Expand the concept of the X.509 cache to provide the functionality of
a certificate store. Certificates in the store will be automatically
used to complete certificate chains where applicable.
The certificate store may be prepopulated at build time using the
CERT=... build command line option. For example:
make bin/ipxe.usb CERT=mycert1.crt,mycert2.crt
Certificates within the certificate store are not implicitly trusted;
the trust list is specified using TRUST=... as before. For example:
make bin/ipxe.usb CERT=root.crt TRUST=root.crt
This can be used to embed the full trusted root certificate within the
iPXE binary, which is potentially useful in an HTTPS-only environment
in which there is no HTTP server from which to automatically download
cross-signed certificates or other certificate chain fragments.
This usage of CERT= extends the existing use of CERT= to specify the
client certificate. The client certificate is now identified
automatically by checking for a match against the private key. For
example:
make bin/ipxe.usb CERT=root.crt,client.crt TRUST=root.crt KEY=client.key
Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
[crypto] Remove dynamically-allocated storage for certificate name
iPXE currently allocates a copy the certificate's common name as a
string. This string is used by the TLS and CMS code to check
certificate names against an expected name, and also appears in
debugging messages.
Provide a function x509_check_name() to centralise certificate name
checking (in preparation for adding subjectAlternativeName support),
and a function x509_name() to provide a name to be used in debugging
messages, and remove the dynamically allocated string.
Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
[tls] Concatenate received non-data records before processing
Allow non-data records to be split across multiple received I/O
buffers, to accommodate large certificate chains.
Reported-by: Nicola Volpini <Nicola.Volpini@kambi.com>
Tested-by: Nicola Volpini <Nicola.Volpini@kambi.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
[tls] Split received records over multiple I/O buffers
TLS servers are not obliged to implement the RFC3546 maximum fragment
length extension, and many common servers (including OpenSSL, as used
in Apache's mod_ssl) do not do so. iPXE may therefore have to cope
with TLS records of up to 16kB. Allocations for 16kB have a
non-negligible chance of failing, causing the TLS connection to abort.
Fix by maintaining the received record as a linked list of I/O
buffers, rather than a single contiguous buffer. To reduce memory
pressure, we also decrypt in situ, and deliver the decrypted data via
xfer_deliver_iob() rather than xfer_deliver_raw().
Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
[tls] Request a maximum fragment length of 2048 bytes
The default maximum plaintext fragment length for TLS is 16kB, which
is a substantial amount of memory for iPXE to have to allocate for a
temporary decryption buffer.
Reduce the memory footprint of TLS connections by requesting a maximum
fragment length of 2kB.
Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
[crypto] Allow certificate chains to be long-lived data structures
At present, certificate chain validation is treated as an
instantaneous process that can be carried out using only data that is
already in memory. This model does not allow for validation to
include non-instantaneous steps, such as downloading a cross-signing
certificate, or determining certificate revocation status via OCSP.
Redesign the internal representation of certificate chains to allow
chains to outlive the scope of the original source of certificates
(such as a TLS Certificate record).
Allow for certificates to be cached, so that each certificate needs to
be validated only once.
Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
[tls] Fix wrong memset in function tls_clear_cipher
sizeof(cipherspec) is obviously wrong in this context, because it will
only zero the first 4 or 8 bytes (cipherspec is a pointer).
This problem was reported by cppcheck.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Weil <sw@weilnetz.de>
Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
[tls] Treat handshake digest algorithm as a session parameter
Simplify code by recording the active handshake digest algorithm as a
session parameter. (Note that we must still accumulate digests for
all supported algorithms, since we don't know which digest will
eventually be used until we receive the Server Hello.)
Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
TLSv1.1 and earlier use a hybrid of MD5 and SHA-1 to generate digests
over the handshake messages. Formalise this as a separate digest
algorithm "md5+sha1".
Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
Validate the server certificate against the trusted root certificate
store. The server must provide a complete certificate chain, up to
and including the trusted root certificate that is embedded into iPXE.
Note that the date and time are not yet validated.
Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
[crypto] Upgrade AES and RSA code to upstream axTLS version 1.4.5
All axTLS files are now vanilla versions of the upstream axTLS files,
with one minor exception: the unused "ctx" parameter of
bi_int_divide() has been marked with "__unused" to avoid a compilation
error.
Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
Advertise support for TLS version 1.1, and be prepared to downgrade to
TLS version 1.0. Tested against Apache with mod_gnutls, using the
GnuTLSPriorities directive to force specific protocol versions.
Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
[process] Pass containing object pointer to process step() methods
Give the step() method a pointer to the containing object, rather than
a pointer to the process. This is consistent with the operation of
interface methods, and allows a single function to serve as both an
interface method and a process step() method.
Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
The handshake record in TLS can contain multiple messages.
Originally-fixed-by: Timothy Stack <tstack@vmware.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
[interface] Convert all data-xfer interfaces to generic interfaces
Remove data-xfer as an interface type, and replace data-xfer
interfaces with generic interfaces supporting the data-xfer methods.
Filter interfaces (as used by the TLS layer) are handled using the
generic pass-through interface capability. A side-effect of this is
that deliver_raw() no longer exists as a data-xfer method. (In
practice this doesn't lose any efficiency, since there are no
instances within the current codebase where xfer_deliver_raw() is used
to pass data to an interface supporting the deliver_raw() method.)
Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
Michael Brown